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Contents
» Draft Constitutions:  Jump to links (on this page) to draft constitutions for the model.
» Summary of the model:  Go to a concise summary of the model.
» Explanation of the model:  Jump (on this page) to a more detailed explanation of the model.
» Longer term reform:  Jump (on this page) to suggestions for longer term reform involving the role of the Constitutional Council.
» Presentation:  Go to an MS PowerPoint presentation which introduces the main features of the Constitutional Council model.  (If you can't read this, you can get MS PowerPoint reader for free  -  click here.)
» Article:  Go to an article as edited version of which was published in the Australian Republican Movment's newsletter about the Constitutional Council model.
 

Draft Constitutions
» Go! to the marked up version of my draft "Constitutional Council model" Constitution with struck out text (indicating deleted words) and bold type (indicating inserted words).
» Go! to the "cleaned" version of my draft "Constitutional Council model" Constitution (struck out text is removed and bold text normalised).
 

Explanation of the Model

Background
This model is a completely fresh, new look at a republican model in the light of the failed 1999 republic referendum.  One of the most significant failures of the referendum was that republicans were divided into two main camps  -  the "minimalists" and the "direct electionists".  Since the referendum, no models (at least that I've been aware of) have appeared which reconciled these camps, and this fact has been my driving motivation in conceiving this model.

Public opinion is clearly and consistently in favour of some sort of model which provides for popular election of the Head of State, and we need to be able to tell the public that they will be able to vote for the Head of State.  One of the major sticking points in popular election models has been that a popularly elected Head of State would also exercise the reserve powers; whilst one of the major sticking points in models providing for an appointed Head of State (appointed by the Parliament, or by an electoral college, or by an appointment committee, or by the Prime Minister) is that the people would not elect the Head of State.

Looking at the current arrangements, it is worth noting the following:

• The Head of State (the Queen) plays only a symbolic role.
• The Governor-General plays a symbolic role and, in exercising the reserve powers, also acts as a constitutional umpire.

First, he must be a person who can undertake the symbolic aspects of the office.  He should strive to unite the nation at times of national crisis or grief and must be able to represent us overseas.  ...  For this, he requires the broad confidence of the Australian people.

...  Second, the governor-general may act as umpire in times of constitutional crisis.  His broad and undefined reserve powers mean he could be called upon to dismiss a prime minister or to determine who should form government after a close election.  To exercise such powers, he must be above politics.

A crisis could be deepened if the governor-general might be thought, even incorrectly, to favour a party that would dismiss him.  He must not only be impartial, but must be seen to be so.

The Constitutional Council model
This model provides for popular election of a Head of State  -  the President  -  who, like the Queen, does not exercise the reserve powers.  Instead, the reserve powers are exercised by the Speaker, with the office of Speaker reformed to be as independent and impartial as the Governor-General currently should be.  The model neatly combines the best elements of the existing constitutional arrangements and those of the most popular republican models, including the ultra-minimalist, minimalist (i.e., election by special parliamentary majority), electoral college and directly elected non-executive President models.  It might sound like it would have to be complicated to achieve this, but it's surprisingly simple, surprisingly effective and  -  hopefully - surprisingly attractive.  It is useful to take Professor Williams' quote above and to modify it to describe the Constitutional Council model:

The President must be a person who can undertake the symbolic aspects of the office.  He should strive to unite the nation at times of national crisis or grief and must be able to represent us overseas.  ...  For this, he requires the broad confidence of the Australian people.

The Speaker may act as umpire whilst presiding over the House of Representatives and in times of constitutional crisis.  His broad and undefined reserve powers mean he could be called upon to dismiss a prime minister or to determine who should form government after a close election, and his powers whilst presiding over the House of Representatives mean that he must constantly use fairness, not political loyalties, as his guide.  To exercise such powers, he must be above politics.  A crisis could be deepened if the Speaker might be thought, even incorrectly, to favour a party that would dismiss him.  He must not only be impartial, but must be seen to be so.

The President and the Constitutional Council
This model proposes a President as Head of State to replace the Queen and the Governor-General.  A Constitutional Council would consist of five directly elected "full" members (these members have a vote on the Constitutional Council) and four ex officio "associate" members (the Speaker, the immediate past Speaker, the immediate past President and the the immediate past Vice-President ) (these members do not have a vote on the Constitutional Council), and one of these full members would be the President.  The model provides for two options regarding how the President is chosen from amongst these full members  -  either the Constitutional Council elects one if its full members to be President, or the full member receiving the highest popular vote would automatically become President.  One member would also be similarly chosen to be the Vice-President.

The President and the Constitutional Council (severally or jointly) would perform a mainly ceremonial and symbolic role.  The President, with the consent of the Constitutional Council, may send bills back to the Parliament for reconsideration once, (a power also enjoyed but never exercised by the Governor-General), but he has no power to veto bills (a power, incidentally, which the Queen currently enjoys but has never exercised).  The President retains none of the reserve powers  -  these are now exercised by the Speaker.  The President and the Constitutional Council are entitled to be advised, to encourage and to warn, and one of their key roles would be to defend (within the bounds of their constitutional powers) the democratic constitutional order of the nation.

For the President and the Constitutional Council:
Term:  6 years.
Eligibility:  Same as for House of Representatives, but can't be an MP or a member of a political party.
Nomination:  1000 nominators.  Nominators may be anyone eligible to vote for the House of Representatives.
Appointment:  Constitutional Council is directly elected.  Under option A, the Constitutional Councillor achieving the highest vote becomes the President.  Under option B, the Constitutional Council chooses one of its number to be President.  Under option C, the Parliament may decide from time to time between option A and option B.
Removal:  2/3 resolution of both Houses.
Casual vacancy on Constitutional Council:  Counting back method used to determine who fills the vacancy.
Casual vacancy in office of President:  Vice-President.
 

The Speaker
The Speaker  -  not the President  -  would assume the reserve powers now exercisable by the Governor-General whilst continuing to be the presiding officer of the House of Representatives.  A number of the remaining non-reserve, nominally discretionary powers (i.e., powers which in theory might allow for the exercise of some discretion but which in practice, by convention, are exercised in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister or of the Federal Executive Council) and explicitly non-discretionary powers currently exercisable by the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council (all of which were exercised in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister or of the Federal Executive Council) would, under this model, be exercisable directly by the Prime Minister or the Federal Executive Council.

Thus, the office of Speaker is reformed to be a more independent, non-partisan office, with the Speaker nominated by the present or any past Speaker, by any past or present Prime Minister, by the Leader of the Opposition, or by any five M.P.s.  The Constitutional Council would then elect a Speaker from amongst these candidates.  The method of nomination and appointment would enable candidates of similar calibre, aptitude and respectability to that of the Governor-General to be selected for the office of Speaker.  The Speaker could be dismissed by the Constitutional Council at its discretion, but only upon a resolution requesting the same by the House of Representatives.  A full list of powers of the President, the Constitutional Council, the Speaker and the Federal Executive Council appears below.

The bonus of this model is that not only does the question of codification or exercise of reserve powers by an elected President not present a problem (as the reserve powers would not be exercisable by a popularly elected President who could claim to have a competing mandate against the Prime Minister), but that the office of Speaker is depoliticised, as all reasonable people would agree it should be, restoring some dignity to, and respect for, the House of Representatives and its members.  Note that:

• in the UK House of Commons the office of Speaker has been substantially depoliticised.
• the Speaker of the Canadian Senate is not elected by the Senate, but is appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister.
• in the Irish Dáil Éireann (lower house) the Chairman (equivalent to a Speaker) continues in office after a general election without needing to contest the election nor to be re-elected.
• in the Maltese House of Representatives the Speaker may be selected from outside the Parliament.
• the Speaker of the US House of Representatives is elected by the House, but the office is overtly political.

The Chancellor
Recognising that the Speaker may at times be attending to other matters (e.g., Constitutional Council meetings or the exercise of reserve powers), a new office of Chancellor of the House of Representatives is created.  The Chancellor is equivalent to a Speaker pro tempore, who presides over the House of Representatives when the Speaker (or a deputy of the Speaker) is not available to preside, much like a deputy of the Speaker.  This is comparable to:

• the US Senate: the Vice-President, according to the US Constitution, is also, ex officio, the President of the US Senate, but in his absence the President pro tempore (who is a Senator chosen by the Senate) presides over the Senate.
• the UK House of Lords: the Lord Chancellor is, ex officio, the Speaker of the House of Lords, but in his absence (and in the absence of a Deputy Speaker) the House may choose a Deputy Chairman or an alternate Speaker.

The term "Chancellor" is used as this title is applied to a similar office in the UK Parliament; namely, the Lord Chancellor.  However, the title is unimportant and I wouldn't care if an alternative title were preferred, or even if the titles "Speaker" and "Chancellor" were swapped.

Term:  Until expiry of House of Representatives.
Eligibility:  Same as for House of Representatives.
Nomination:  Any MP.
Appointment:  Elected by House of Representatives.
Removal:  By Speaker or by House of Representatives.
Casual vacancy:  Nothing prevents House from choosing Deputy Chancellor(s) or Acting Chancellor(s).
 

Advantage of the Constitutional Council Model over the Sovereign Council Model
The advantage of this model over my Sovereign Council model of 2001 is that in the Constitutional Council model, the office of Governor-General is not retained.  This addresses the concern that the Sovereign Council model is a "bicephalic" (two-headed) model with a President and a Governor-General, whilst retaining all of its advantages and additionally addressing the perennial issue of depoliticisation of the office of Speaker.  Another concern would be with potential overlap and/or conflict of Head of State type roles and responsibilities between the President and the Governor-General:  whereas under current arrangements the Head of State is absent for the vast majority of the time, the Governor-General plays a Head of State type role;  however, as a President would be present for the vast majority of the time, a large slice of the Governor-General's role under current arrangements would pass to the President, raising the question of whether the Governor-General actually has enough to do, and thus whether the Governor-General adds sufficient value.
 

Two options for election of the President: Direct Popular Election and Indirect Popular Election
Two types of popular election are proposed for the President and Vice-President: direct and indirect popular election.  This is set out in section 2, in which three options are provided, only one of which must be chosen to be included in the final Constitution:

OPTION A. Direct popular election.  This option provides that when the Council is elected, the candidate with the highest vote becomes the President and the candidate with the second highest vote becomes the Vice-President.

OPTION B. Indirect popular election.  This option provides that after the Council is elected, the Council meets to choose one of its number to be President and one to be Vice-President.  The Council member chosen as President need not be the member who obtained the highest vote at the election of the Council, though the President will of course have been directly elected as a Council member.

OPTION C. Parliament decides.  This option empowers the Parliament to decide from time to time, as it sees fit, between direct (option A) or indirect (option B) popular election.  This provides the greatest flexibility, allowing the Parliament to change from one method to the other should it deem one model preferable to another, or should popular opinion demand one model over another.  By default, option B applies; however, it could be expected that popular opinion would be more in favour of option A.  By having option B apply first, the model can be tried out for, say, one or two Presidential terms, and if public opinion remains strongly in favour of model A, the Parliament can prescribe this without the need for another referendum.

The reserve powers
Reserve powers constitute certain discretionary powers which, under current arrangements, may be exercised by the Governor-General.  The reserve powers of the Governor-General under current arrangements include the following:

• (1) The Governor-General appoints and dismisses a Prime Minister.  As the Prime Minister is not mentioned in the Constitution, the sections which apply to the appointment of ministers also apply to the Prime Minister.  (s62 and s64)
• (2) The Governor-General may dissolve the House of Representatives.  (s5 and s28)
• (3) The Governor-General may refuse to dissolve the House of Representatives when so advised by the Prime Minister if the Prime Minister has lost the confidence of the House of Representatives or has not yet obtained it.  (s5 and s28)
• (4) The Governor-General may refuse to simultaneously dissolve the House of Representatives and the Senate (i.e., to call a double dissolution) when so advised.  (s57)

• (1a) The Speaker appoints as Prime Minister the person whom he believes would be most likely to command the confidence of the House of Representatives, unless the House of Representatives declares confidence in another person, in which case the Speaker must appoint that person.  (s63, paragraph 2)
• (1b) The Speaker may remove the Prime Minister from office if he has lost the confidence of the House of Representatives and has failed to resign, unless the Prime Minister has advised the Speaker to dissolve the House of Representatives and the Speaker has accepted the advice.  (s63A)
• (2) If the executive government is behaving unlawfully, the Speaker may dissolve the House of Representatives, and he may also remove the Prime Minister from office and appoint a caretaker Prime Minister.  (s63B)
• (3) The Speaker may refuse to dissolve the House of Representatives if the Prime Minister has lost the confidence of the House of Representatives or has not yet obtained it.  (s28)
• (4) The Speaker may refuse to simultaneously dissolve the House of Representatives and the Senate (i.e., to call a double dissolution) when so advised.  (s57)

Classification of powers and functions
Under current arrangements, I have classified certain powers and functions (mainly of the Queen and the Governor-General) as follows.  These are my terms which I have used for the sake of comparison with the Constitutional Council model; they are not used in the Constitution.

• Discretionary powers and functions are powers and functions which may be exercised with, without or contrary to any advice.  These powers and functions include the reserve powers, but might include powers which are not universally agreed to be reserve powers but which are clearly granted to the Governor-General.
• Nominally discretionary powers and functions are powers and functions of the Queen or the Governor-General under current arrangements which, according to a literal interpretation of the Constitution, are discretionary.  By convention, however, these powers and functions are only exercised in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council or the Prime Minister (so in effect are non-discretionary), or are not exercised at all.
• Miscellaneous powers and functions are powers and functions which cannot be easily classified, and which may simply define a role rather than assign powers.  These must be read on a case by case basis.

• Discretionary powers and functions are powers and functions which may be exercised with, without or contrary to any advice.  This is defined and explained in s126B of the Constitutional Council model draft Constitution.  These powers and functions include the reserve powers listed above under the heading "The reserve powers".  This is broadly equivalent to the "discretionary powers and functions" under current arrangements.
• Qualified discretionary powers and functions refers only to powers and functions of the Speaker under the Constitutional Council model.  These are powers and functions which may be exercised without advice where no conflicting advice is provided, except that in the case of the Speaker, if the Speaker is advised by the Federal Executive Council to exercise such a power, the Speaker is then bound to act in accordance with that advice.  This is defined and explained in s126C of the Constitutional Council model draft Constitution.  This is a sort of hybrid of the "discretionary powers and functions" and "nominally discretionary powers and functions" under current arrangements.
• Non-discretionary powers and functions may be exercised only in accordance with the specified advice.  This is defined in s126A of the Constitutional Council model draft Constitution.  This is broadly equivalent to the "nominally discretionary powers and functions" under current arrangements.
• Miscellaneous powers and functions are powers and functions which cannot be easily classified, and which may simply define a role rather than assign powers.  These must be read on a case by case basis.

Providing for veto by the Constitutional Council of the exercise of the reserve powers by the Speaker
The draft Constitutional Council model constitutions, as presented on this web site, provide for the exercise of the reserve powers by the Speaker.  The exercise of these reserve powers may be defined so as to be subject to veto by the Constitutional Council, or so as not to be subject to veto.  Under current arrangements, in practice, the exercise of these reserve powers by the Governor-General is not subject to veto or review (although monarchists would disingenuously suggest that the Queen plays some role as a "backstop" by checking, reviewing or limiting the powers of the Governor-General).  This was tested in 1975 when the Speaker requested intervention from the Queen following the sacking of Gough Whitlam as Prime Minister, and the Queen replied that it was improper for her to intervene, and again in 2003 when the Queen refused to become involved in the controversy surrounding then Governor-General Dr. Peter Hollingworth.

Should it be considered desirable to make the exercise of the reserve powers subject to veto, it is easy to provide for the Constitutional Council to act as a "backstop" to review and possibly veto the exercise of reserve powers.  I'd suggest that in order to discourage frivolous use of this review and veto power it should be made quite difficult for the Constitutional Council to act by:

• limiting the period of review to 1 day following the exercise of a reserve power (any longer would make it difficult to "unscramble the constitutional egg"  -  imagine if a dismissal of a Government and the appointment of a caretaker Government was annulled more than one day thereafter!);
• requiring four out of the five full members to vote in favour of a veto (i.e., the Constitutional Council would have to be strongly in favour of a veto); and
• requiring that one of those four voting in favour of a veto be the President (i.e., the President would have to be in favour of a veto).

126D. When a provision of this Constitution provides that an act of the Speaker is subject to the review of the Constitutional Council, the Speaker may act (or omit to act) according to his discretion, except that no more than four days before so acting he shall inform the Constitutional Council of his intention to act, and within one day of the Speaker having so acted, the Constitutional Council may, by a resolution affirmed by four full members (one of whom shall be the President), disallow the act of the Speaker, and such disallowance shall annul the act from the time the act was performed.

Section 126D is based on the original section 59, which, though never invoked, empowers the Queen to veto laws:

The Queen may disallow any law within one year from the Governor-General's assent, and such disallowance on being made known by the Governor-General by speech or message to each of the House of the Parliament, or by Proclamation, shall annul the law from the day when the disallowance is made known.

28. [paragraph 2] However, the Speaker may, according to his discretion, but subject to the review of the Constitutional Council, refuse to dissolve the House of Representatives on the advice of the Prime Minister when a Prime Minister has lost the confidence of the House of Representatives or has not yet obtained it.

57. [paragraph 2] However, the Speaker may, according to his discretion, but subject to the review of the Constitutional Council, refuse to dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously.

63. [paragraph 2] Not later than ten days after the day appointed for the return of the writs after any general election, or not later than ten days after the office of Prime Minister becomes vacant, the Speaker shall, according to his discretion, but subject to the review of the Constitutional Council, appoint as Prime Minister that person whom he believes would be most likely to command the confidence of the House of Representatives.

63A. The Speaker may, according to his discretion, but subject to the review of the Constitutional Council, remove from office a Prime Minister who has lost the confidence of the House of Representatives and has failed to resign, unless the Prime Minister has advised the Speaker to dissolve the House of Representatives, and the Speaker has accepted that advice.

63B. If the Speaker believes that the Executive Government of the Commonwealth is breaching this Constitution, or is not complying with an order of a court, or is persisting in other unlawful behaviour, the Speaker may, according to his discretion, but subject to the review of the Constitutional Council, dissolve the House of Representatives or dissolve the House of Representatives and remove the Prime Minister from office. In the event of the Prime Minister being so removed from office, the Speaker may, according to his discretion, appoint as Prime Minister such other person whom the Speaker believes will take all reasonable steps to end the contravention and who will maintain the administration of the Commonwealth pending the outcome of the general election following such dissolution.

Powers and functions of the "Principal Officers of the Commonwealth"
The term "Principal Officers of the Commonwealth" is a new term which has been created for convenience only, obviating the need to enumerate all offices to which the term applies in every instance.  The "Principal Officers of the Commonwealth" are defined in section 127, and comprise:

• the President and the Vice-President;
• the Constitutional Council;
• the Prime Minister;
• the Federal Executive Council;
• the Speaker and the President of the Senate; and
• the Chief Justice.

Powers and functions of the President
The President is the Head of State, and performs a mainly ceremonial and symbolic role.  All powers and functions of the President are, like the Governor-General, subject to due regard being had to constitutional conventions, and with the exception of powers or functions expressly vested in the President by the Constitution (see the table below), powers or functions vested in the President (e.g., by legislation) can (unless otherwise provided) only be exercised or performed in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.
 

Constitutional Council model	Type of power/function	Current arrangements	Type of power/function
s3A: The President may declare that an Acting President cease to act as President.	Discretionary	N/A	N/A
s7: Names of senators chosen for each State are certified by the Governor to the President.	Non- discretionary	s7: Names of senators chosen for each State are certified by the Governor to the Governor-General.	Non- discretionary
s19: A senator may resign his seat by writing to the President in the absence of the President of the Senate.	Non- discretionary	s19: A senator may resign his seat by writing to the Governor-General in the absence of the President of the Senate.	Non- discretionary
s21: In the absence of the President of the Senate the President notifies a Governor of a vacancy in the Senate.	Non- discretionary	s21: In the absence of the President of the Senate the Governor-General notifies a Governor of a vacancy in the Senate.	Non- discretionary
s35D: The President administers oath/affirmation of office to the Speaker.	Non- discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution.	N/A
s35E: The President exercises (with the consent of the Constitutional Council) the powers and functions of the Speaker whilst an action to dismiss the Speaker is pending, except that the Acting Speaker presides during this time over the House of Representatives.	Reserve	N/A as there is no provision for an action being taken to dismiss the Governor-General, but note that whereas the President would be able to exercise reserve powers only at this time, the GG can exercise the reserve powers at all times.	Reserve
s35E: The Speaker may resign his office or seat by writing to the President.	Non- discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution.	N/A
s37: A member of the H of R may resign his seat by writing to the President in the absence of the Speaker.	Non- discretionary	s37: A member of the H of R may resign his seat by writing to the Governor-General in the absence of the Speaker.	Non- discretionary
s42: The President administers the oath/affirmation of allegiance to MPs.	Non- discretionary	s42: The Governor-General administers the oath/affirmation of allegiance to MPs.	Non- discretionary
ss57,58: The President may assent to bills presented for assent.  He may withhold assent and (with the consent of the Constitutional Council) return bills to the Parliament with recommendations, but if the Parliament again passes the bill he may not again return it.	Discretionary	ss57,58. The Governor-General may assent to bills presented for assent.  He may withhold assent and return bills to Parliament with recommendations.  He may reserve the bill "for the Queen's pleasure". s59.  The Queen may veto any law within a year of its having been assented to.	Nominally discretionary
s68: The President is Commander in Chief of the military, but any powers/functions he exercises/performs must be in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.	Non- discretionary	s68: The Governor-General is Commander in Chief of the military.	Nominally discretionary
s69: The President, acting only in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council, declares war, appoints diplomatic representatives, grants reprieves and pardons and confers honours and titles.	Non- discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution.	N/A
s70A: The immediate past President and the immediate past Vice-President are associate (non-voting) members of the Constitutional Council.	N/A	N/A	N/A
s70F: A member of the Constitutional Council may resign his seat by writing to the President.	Non- discretionary	N/A	N/A
s70I: The President presides over the Constitutional Council, convenes meetings of the Constitutional Council and has a casting vote when votes on the Constitutional Council are tied.	Discretionary	N/A	N/A
s72: The President appoints the Justices of the High Court in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.	Non- discretionary	s72: The Governor-General appoints the Justices of the High Court in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.	Non- discretionary
s72: The President removes Justices of the High Court in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council (under certain conditions).	Non- discretionary	s72: The Governor-General removes Justices of the High Court in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council (under certain conditions).	Non- discretionary
s72: A Justice or a judge may resign his office by writing to the President.	Non- discretionary	s72: A Justice or a judge may resign his office by writing to the Governor-General.	Non- discretionary
s103: The President appoints the members of the Inter-State Commission in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.	Non- discretionary	s103: The Governor-General appoints the members of the Inter-State Commission in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.	Non- discretionary
s103: The President removes members of the Inter-State Commission in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council (under certain conditions).	Non- discretionary	s103: The Governor-General removes members of the Inter-State Commission in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council (under certain conditions).	Non- discretionary
s127: References to the Crown are deemed to refer in a symbolic and ceremonial sense to the President.	N/A	s2: The Governor-General is the Queen's representative.	N/A
s128: The President assents to bills amending the Constitution if passed at a referendum.	Non- discretionary	s128: The Governor-General assents to bills amending the Constitution if passed at a referendum.	Non- discretionary

Powers and functions of the Constitutional Council
The Constitutional Council appoints the President, the Vice-President and the Speaker.  Otherwise it performs a mainly ceremonial and symbolic role.
 

Constitutional Council model	Type of power/function	Current arrangements	Type of power/function
s2 [option B]: The Constitutional Council elects one of its members to be President and one to be Vice-President.	Discretionary	N/A	N/A
s3. The Speaker and the Constitutional Council may declare the President temporarily incapacitated.	Discretionary	N/A	N/A
s35A. In the absence of nomination of candidates for the office of Speaker, the Constitutional Council may nominate candidates for the office.	Discretionary	N/A	N/A
s35B. The Constitutional Council chooses one of the candidates for the office of Speaker to be the Speaker.  The candidates are nominated by the House of Representatives.	Discretionary	s2. The Queen appoints the Governor-General [on the advice of the Prime Minister]. s35. The House of Representatives chooses one of its members to be Speaker.	s2. Discretionary (for the PM) s35. Discretionary (for the House of Reps)
s35E. The Constitutional Council may remove the Speaker from office on an address from the House of Representatives praying for removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.	Discretionary	s2. [The Queen removes the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister].	s2. Discretionary (for the PM)
s35E. The Constitutional Council may consent to the exercise by the President of powers or functions of the Speaker whilst an action to dismiss the Speaker is pending.  (During this time the Acting Speaker presides over the House of Representatives.)	Discretionary	N/A as there is no provision for an action being taken to dismiss the Governor-General, but note that whereas the President would be able to exercise reserve powers only at this time, the GG can exercise the reserve powers at all times.	Reserve
s35F. The Constitutional Council may consent to an appointment by the Speaker of a deputy to the Speaker.	Discretionary	s126. The Queen may authorise the Governor-General to appoint a deputy to the Governor-General.	Nominally discretionary
s35G. The Constitutional Council may prescribe officers, and the precedence of those officers, to act as Speaker in the absence of deputies of the Speaker.	Discretionary	N/A	N/A
s35G. The Constitutional Council may declare the Speaker temporarily incapacitated.	Discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution.	N/A
s70. The Constitutional Council may engage in any symbolic or ceremonial functions.	Miscellaneous	Implied; e.g., in first sentence of the Preamble.	Miscellaneous
s70. The Constitutional Council may seek advice, encourage or warn.	Miscellaneous	Implied; e.g., in first sentence of the Preamble.	Miscellaneous
s110A. The Constitutional Council may, if authorised by the laws of a State, and if it agrees to do so, play a role in the nomination, designation and dismissal of the Governors of the States.	Miscellaneous	Specified in State Constitutions and the Australia Act(s): The Queen appoints and dismisses the Governors of the States.	Nominally discretionary
s126A. The Constitutional Council may set a date that an act which is required by the Constitution to be performed, but which the relevant officer refuses to perform or fails to perform, is nevertheless deemed to be performed.  (The Federal Executive Council may exercise the same power.)	Discretionary	N/A	N/A

Powers and functions of the Speaker
The Speaker is the presiding officer of the House of Representatives and is a non-voting member of the Constitutional Council.  He can appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, dissolve the House of Representatives, dismiss the Chancellor, issue writs for elections for the House of Representatives, summon the Parliament and convene joint sittings, and recommend appropriation bills to Parliament.
 

Constitutional Council model	Type of power/function	Current arrangements	Type of power/function
s2A. The Speaker appoints officers to administer the oath/affirmation of office to the President and Vice-President where those otherwise provided for are unavailable and where no other provision has been made.	Discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution.	N/A
s3. The Speaker appoints officers to act as President where those otherwise provided for are unavailable and where no other provision has been made.	Discretionary	s4. The Queen may appoint a person to administer the Government of the Commonwealth in place of the Governor-General.	Nominally discretionary
s3. The Speaker and the Constitutional Council may declare the President temporarily incapacitated.	Discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution.	N/A
s5. The Speaker may appoint times for the holding of sessions of Parliament (including joint sittings), and may prorogue the Parliament.	Qualified discretionary	s5. The Governor-General may appoint times for the holding of sessions of Parliament, and may prorogue the Parliament.	Nominally discretionary
s5. The Speaker may (subject to other provisions) dissolve the House of Representatives.  This power is defined and constrained by other powers listed here.	Miscellaneous	s5. The Governor-General may dissolve the House of Representatives.	Nominally discretionary
s28. The Speaker must dissolve the House of Representatives when so advised by the Prime Minister (except that he may refuse to do so if the Prime Minister has lost the confidence of the House of Representatives or has not yet obtained it).	Non-discretionary	s28. The Governor-General may dissolve the House of Representatives before the expiration of its term.	Nominally discretionary
s28. The Speaker may refuse to dissolve the House of Representatives if the Prime Minister has lost the confidence of the House of Representatives or has not yet obtained it.	Reserve	s57. [Implies that the Governor-General may refuse to dissolve the House of Representatives before the expiration of its term.]	Reserve
s32. The Speaker issues writs for general elections of members of the House of Representatives.	Non-discretionary	s32. The Governor-General in Council issues writs for general elections of members of the House of Representatives.	Non-discretionary
s33. The Speaker issues writs for the election of a new member to a vacancy in the House of Representatives.	Non-discretionary	s33. Same.	Non-discretionary
s35. The Speaker presides over the House of Representatives.	Miscellaneous	s35. Same.	Miscellaneous
s35A. The Speaker may nominate candidates for the office of Speaker.	Discretionary	s35. The House of Representativeschooses the Speaker.	Discretionary
s35F. The Speaker may (with the consent of the Constitutional Council) appoint a deputy and may assign powers and functions to the deputy.	Discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution. C.f. s126. The Queen may authorise the Governor-General to appoint deputies.	Nominally discretionary
s35G. The Speaker appoints officers to act as Speaker where those otherwise provided for are unavailable and where no other provision has been made.	Discretionary	N/A	N/A
s35H. The Speaker may declare that an Acting Speaker cease to act as Speaker.	Discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution.	N/A
s36. The Speaker may remove the Chancellor of the House of Representatives from office.	Discretionary	N/A	N/A
s36. The Chancellor may resign his office by writing to the Speaker.	Non-discretionary	C.f. s35.  The Speaker may resign his office by writing to the Governor-General.	Non-discretionary
s37. A member of the House of Representatives may resign his seat by writing to the Speaker.	Non-discretionary	s37. Same.	Non-discretionary
s56. The Speaker recommends appropriation bills.	Qualified discretionary	s56. The Governor-General recommends appropriation bills.	Nominally discretionary
s57 (1st paragraph). The Speaker may dissolve the House of Representatives and the Senate (a double dissolution) when so advised by the Federal Executive Council and when the conditions for a double dissolution (involving disagreement between the Houses) have been met.	Non-discretionary, but read in conjunction with s57 (2nd paragraph)	s57. The Governor-General may dissolve the House of Representatives and the Senate (a double dissolution) when the conditions for a double dissolution (involving disagreement between the Houses) have been met.	Reserve
s57 (2nd paragraph). The Speaker may refuse to dissolve the House of Representatives and the Senate (a double dissolution).	Reserve	s57. [Implies that the Governor-General may refuse to dissolve the House of Representatives and the Senate (a double dissolution).]	Reserve
s57 (3rd paragraph). The Speaker may convene a joint sitting after a double dissolution.	Qualified discretionary	s57. The Governor-General may convene a joint sitting after a double dissolution.	Nominally discretionary
s63. The Speaker appoints as Prime Minister the person whom he believes would be most likely to command the confidence of the House of Representatives, unless the House of Representatives declares confidence in another person, in which case the Speaker must appoint that person.	Reserve	Not explicit in the Constitution, but see s62 (Governor-General appoints Federal Executive Council) and s64 (Governor-General appoints Ministers).	Reserve
s63A. The Speaker may remove the Prime Minister from office if he has lost the confidence of the House of Representatives and has failed to resign, unless the Prime Minister has advised the Speaker to dissolve the House of Representatives and the Speaker has accepted the advice.	Reserve	Not explicit in the Constitution, but see s62 (Governor-General appoints Federal Executive Council) and s64 (Governor-General appoints Ministers).	Reserve
s63B. If the executive government is behaving unlawfully, the Speaker may dissolve the House of Representatives, and he may also remove the Prime Minister from office and appoint a caretaker Prime Minister.	Reserve	Not explicit in the Constitution, but see s62 (Governor-General appoints Federal Executive Council), s64 (Governor-General appoints Ministers) s5 and s28 (Governor-General may dissolve House of Representatives).	Reserve
s70A. The Speaker(and the immediate past Speaker) are ex-officio non-voting members of the Constitutional Council.	Miscellaneous	N/A	N/A
s70C. The Speaker issues writs for Constitutional Council elections..	Non-discretionary	N/A	N/A

Powers and functions of the Federal Executive Council
The Federal Executive Council, which is headed by the Prime Minister, is the principal organ of the executive government.  It advises the Speaker in respect of the exercise of certain powers (calling a double dissolution, summoning the Parliament and convening joint sittings, recommending appropriation bills to Parliament), establishes departments, appoints public servants and other officers, and advises the President in respect of the exercise of certain powers.

All powers and functions of the Federal Executive Council are discretionary.  The following powers and functions are listed in order of their appearance in the Constitution:
 

Constitutional Council model	Type of power/function	Current arrangements	Type of power/function
s5. The Federal Executive Council may advise the Speaker to appoint times for the holding of sessions of Parliament, and to prorogue the Parliament.	Discretionary	s5. The Governor-General may appoint times for the holding of sessions of Parliament, and may prorogue the Parliament.	Nominally discretionary
s56. The Federal Executive Council may advise the Speaker to recommend appropriation bills.	Discretionary	s56. The Governor-General recommends appropriation bills.	Nominally discretionary
s57. The Federal Executive Council may advise the Speaker to call a double dissolution when the conditions for a double dissolution (involving disagreement between the Houses) have been met.	Discretionary	s57. The Governor-General may dissolve the House of Representatives and the Senate (a double dissolution) when the conditions for a double dissolution (involving disagreement between the Houses) have been met.	Nominally discretionary
s57. The Federal Executive Council may advise the Speaker to convene a joint sitting after a double dissolution.  (The Speaker may also exercise this power independently.)	Discretionary	s57. The Governor-General may convene a joint sitting after a double dissolution.	Nominally discretionary
s60. The Federal Executive Council administers the Government of the Commonwealth, and the executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in and exercisable by it.  It exercises the powers and functions of, and enjoys the rights, privileges and immunities of, the Crown in right of the Commonwealth.	Discretionary	s61. The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and executable by the Governor-General.	Nominally discretionary
s64. The Federal Executive Council may establish departments.	Discretionary	s64. The Governor-General in Council may establish departments.	Discretionary
s67. The Federal Executive Council may appoint all other officers of the executive government.	Discretionary	s67. The Governor-General in Council may appoint all other officers of the executive government.	Discretionary
ss68, 69, 72, 103. The Federal Executive Council advises the President in respect of the exercise/performance of certain powers/functions (see the powers of the President).	Discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution.	N/A
s126A. The Federal Executive Council may set a date that an act which is required by the Constitution to be performed, but which the relevant officer refuses to perform or fails to perform, is nevertheless deemed to be performed.  (The Constitutional Council may exercise the same power.)	Discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution.	N/A

Powers and functions of the Prime Minister
The Prime Minister is the Head of Government.  He/she can advise the Speaker to dissolve the House of Representatives, submit nominations (along with others) for the office of Speaker to the Constitutional Council, is President of the Federal Executive Council and decides on the composition of the Cabinet/Ministry.

All powers and functions of the Prime Minister are discretionary.  The following powers and functions are listed in order of their appearance in the Constitution:
 

Constitutional Council model	Type of power/function	Current arrangements	Type of power/function
s28. The Prime Minister may advise the Speaker to dissolve the House of Representatives.	Discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution.	N/A
s35A. The Prime Minister may nominate the Speaker (others also may nominate the Speaker).	Discretionary	s35. The House of Representatives chooses the Speaker.	Discretionary
s63. The Prime Minister is President of the Federal Executive Council and convenes meetings of the Federal Executive Council.	Discretionary	Not specified in the Constitution. C.f. s62. The Federal Executive Council is summoned by the Governor-General.	Nominally discretionary
s63. The Prime Minister appoints and dismisses Ministers and assigns portfolios to them.	Discretionary	s62 and s64. The Governor-General appoints and dismisses Ministers and assigns portfolios to them.	Nominally discretionary

Longer Term Reform

There is, potentially, scope for other powers to be assigned to the President or to the Constitutional Council at some future time, but I would not recommend that consideration be given to these suggestions at any referendum to establish a republic - subsequent referendums should decide these matters.  These powers would be exercised by the President acting with the advice and consent of the Constitutional Council, and could include:

• the awarding of national honours, titles and decorations.
• the appointment of High Court Justices (instead of effective appointment by the Government of the day)
• the appointment of a Judicial Commission to appoint other judges (with input from the judiciary, the executive government and the Parliament).
• the appointment of non-voting members of the Senate for the remainder of the term thereof (such as indigenous members).  (This would be similar to appointed peers in the UK House of Lords.)
• the appointment of the Auditor-General, the Ombudsman, the Human Rights Commission, the Electoral Commission, an Anti-corruption Commission, and such other agencies which should be completely free from political interference or manipulation by the executive government of the day.
• the power to introduce legislation (in particular, in relation to the offices mentioned above).
• the granting of pardons, commutation of sentences, and the granting of extraordinary certificates to (re)appeal to a court (including the High Court).
• the power to initiate, review or reject any rule or order of the House of Representatives or of the Senate (pertaining to the conduct of its own affairs).
• the power to appoint and dismiss the President of the Senate in like manner as the Speaker.