And whereas it is expedient to provide for the admission into the Commonwealth of other Australasian Colonies and possessions of the Queen: 

Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: 

"The States" shall mean such of the colonies of New South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia, and South Australia, including the northern territory of South Australia, as for the time being are parts of the Commonwealth, and such colonies or territories as may be admitted into or established by the Commonwealth as States; and each of such parts of the Commonwealth shall be called "a State". 

"Original States" shall mean such States as are parts of the Commonwealth at its establishment.
This has been updated and moved to s127.

Any such law may be repealed as to any State by the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or as to any colony not being a State by the Parliament thereof.
This has been updated and moved to s12 of Schedule II.

Chapter I - The President
Chapter IA - The Parliament

Part I - General
Part II - The Senate
Part III - The House of Representatives
Part IV - Both Houses of the Parliament
Part V - Powers of the Government

Chapter II - The Executive Government
Chapter IIA - The Constitutional Council
Chapter III - The Judicature
Chapter IV - Finance and Trade
Chapter V - The States
Chapter VI - New States
Chapter VII - Miscellaneous
Chapter VIII - Alteration of the Constitution
The Schedule
Schedule I - Oaths and Affirmations
Schedule II - Transitional and Temporary Provisions

With the exception of powers or functions vested in the President by this Constitution, any power or function vested by any law, rule, decree or order in the President shall, unless otherwise provided, be exercised or performed only in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.

As often as the office of President or Vice-President becomes vacant the Constitutional Council shall, before proceeding to the dispatch of any other business, choose one of its full members to be the President and one of its full members to be the Vice-President.  In so choosing the President and Vice-President, the full members of the Constitutional Council shall vote by secret ballot, and the method of voting shall be optional preferential.
This provides for the direct popular election of the President and Vice-President by the people.

(i) The new Constitutional Council shall, before proceeding to the dispatch of any other business, choose one of its full members to be the President and one of its full members to be the Vice-President.  In so choosing the President and Vice-President, the full members of the Constitutional Council shall vote by secret ballot, and the method of voting shall be optional preferential.

(ii) The votes to fill the vacant places of full members of the Constitutional Council shall continue to be counted as though the election were conducted in order to fill two vacant places.  The candidate obtaining the highest vote is thereby designated as the next President, and the candidate obtaining the second highest vote is thereby designated as the next Vice-President.

At all other times, as often as the office of President or Vice-President becomes vacant the Constitutional Council shall, before proceeding to the dispatch of any other business, choose one of its full members to be the President and one of its full members to be the Vice-President.  In so choosing the President and Vice-President, the full members of the Constitutional Council shall vote by secret ballot, and the method of voting shall be optional preferential.

This empowers the Parliament to decide whether the President is directly (i.e., sub-section(i)) or indirectly (i.e., sub-section(ii)) popularly elected.

But unless a President (or a Vice-President) dies, resigns or is removed from office in accordance with this Constitution, notwithstanding the expiration of his term of service, the President (or the Vice-President) shall continue in office until his successor enters upon the office. 

A person may not serve as President or as Vice-President for more than twelve years and one month cumulatively.
This prevents a person holding the office of President or Vice-President for an unacceptably long period of time.

The Vice-President may resign or stand aside from the office of Vice-President by writing addressed to the President, or if there is no President or if the President is absent from the Commonwealth the Vice-President, or if there is no Vice-President or if the Vice-President is absent from the Commonwealth the Chief Justice of the High Court, or if there is no Chief Justice of the High Court or if the Chief Justice of the High Court is absent from the Commonwealth to such officers as the Parliament may prescribe for the purpose, or in the absence of such provision, to such officer as the President shall appoint. Such act shall take effect at the time specified therein.

(i) The Vice-President.

(ii) Such members of the Constitutional Council in such order of precedence as the Constitutional Council may prescribe.

(iii) The President of the Senate.

(iv) The Chancellor of the House of Representatives.

(v) Such officers in such order of precedence as the Speaker may, by Proclamation or otherwise, appoint.

The President shall be deemed to be temporarily incapacitated upon declaration of the same by the President, or upon declaration of the same by the Speaker and the Constitutional Council.  If the President stands aside from office the provisions of this Constitution relating to temporary incapacity of the President shall apply mutatis mutandis.
This clearly defines the conditions under which a President is temporarily incapacitated.  If the President stands aside, the same conditions as temporary incapacity apply.

If within four days of such declaration the Speaker and the Constitutional Council declare that the President is temporarily incapacitated the Parliament shall meet not later than two days thereafter to decide the issue. Not later than twenty-one days after such declaration the Parliament may declare by a resolution to that effect in both Houses of the Parliament in the same session affirmed by two thirds of the total number of the members of each of those Houses that the President is temporarily incapacitated, but if a House rejects or fails to pass the resolution, or in the absence of a resolution, the President shall be deemed not to be temporarily incapacitated.
This ensures that a President cannot be unjustly prevented from resuming his/her duties.

The salary of a Governor-General shall not be altered during his continuance in office.
This will become obsolete at the establishment of a republic.

and Subject to this Constitution, the Speaker may in like manner, by Proclamation or otherwise, dissolve the House of Representatives.
This gives power to the Speaker to dissolve the House of Representatives in certain circumstances as described in s28, s57 and s63B.

But until the Parliament of the Commonwealth otherwise provides, the Parliament of the State of Queensland, if that State be an Original State, may make laws dividing the State into divisions and determining the number of senators to be chosen for each division, and in the absence of such provision the State shall be one electorate.
Spent.

Until Unless the Parliament otherwise provides there shall be six senators for each Original State. The Parliament may make laws increasing or diminishing the number of senators for each State, but so that equal representation of the several Original States shall be maintained and that no Original State shall have less than six senators. 
Using the word "unless" instead of "until" enables the provision to revive if, for some unlikely reason, all laws overriding this provision were repealed.

The senators shall be chosen for a term of six years, and the names of the senators chosen for each State shall be certified by the Governor to the Governor-General President.
This is a ceremonial role for the President.  One might question whether Governors should continue to have a role here as the office of Governor might well become politicesed in some States, particularly if Governors are directly elected.

The election to fill vacant places shall be made within one year before the places are to become vacant. 

For the purposes of this section the term of service of a senator shall be taken to begin on the first day of July following the day of his election, except in the cases of the first election and [Spent.] of the election next after any dissolution of the Senate, when it shall be taken to begin on the first day of July preceding the day of his election. 

Where a vacancy has at any time occurred in the place of a senator chosen by the people of a State and, at the time when he was so chosen, he was publicly recognised by a particular political party as being an endorsed candidate of that party and publicly represented himself to be such a candidate, a person chosen or appointed under this section in consequence of that vacancy, shall, unless there is no member of that party available to be chosen or appointed, be a member of that party. 

Where - 

(a) in accordance with the last preceding paragraph, a member of particular political party is chosen or appointed to hold the place of a senator whose place has become vacant; and 

(b) before taking his seat he ceases to be a member of that party (otherwise than by reason of the party having ceased to exist),

The name of any senator chosen or appointed under this section shall be certified by the Governor of the State to the Governor-GeneralPresident.
This is a ceremonial role for the President.  See my comments in s7 regarding the role of the Governor.

If the place of a senator chosen by the people of a State at the election of senators last held before the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies) 1977 became vacant before that commencement and, at that commencement, no person chosen by the House or Houses of Parliament of the State, or appointed by the Governor of the State, in consequence of that vacancy, or in consequence of that vacancy and a subsequent vacancy or vacancies, held office, this section applies as if the place of the senator chosen by the people of the State has become vacant after that commencement. 

A senator holding office at the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies) 1977, being a senator appointed by the Governor of a State in consequence of a vacancy that had at any time occurred in the place of a senator chosen by the people of the State, shall be deemed to have been appointed to hold the place until the expiration of fourteen days after the beginning of the next session of the Parliament of the State that commenced or commences after he was appointed and further action under this section shall be taken as if the vacancy in the place of the senator chosen by the people of the State had occurred after that commencement. 

Subject to the next succeeding paragraph, a senator holding office at the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies) 1977 who was chosen by the House or Houses of Parliament of a State in consequence of a vacancy that had at any time occurred in the place of a senator chosen by the people of the State shall be deemed to have been chosen to hold office until the expiration of the term of service of the senator elected by the people of the State. 

If, at or before the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies) 1977, a law to alter the Constitution entitled "Constitution Alteration (Simultaneous Elections) 1977" came into operation, a senator holding office at the commencement of that law who was chosen by the House or Houses of Parliament of a State in consequence of a vacancy that had at any time occurred in the place of a senator chosen by the people of a State shall be deemed to have been chosen to hold office - 

(a) if the senator elected by the people of the State had a term of service expiring on the thirtieth day of June, One thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight - until the expiration or dissolution of the first House of Representatives to expire or be dissolved after that law come into operation; or 

(b) if the senator elected by the people of the State had a term of service expiring on the thirtieth day of June, One thousand nine hundred and eighty-one until the expiration or dissolution of the second House of Representatives to expire or be dissolved after that law came into operation or, if there is an earlier dissolution of the Senate, until that dissolution.

The President of the Senate shall cease to hold his office if he ceases to be a senator. He may be removed from office by a vote of the Senate, or he may resign his office or his seat by writing to the Governor-General President.
This is a ceremonial role for the President.

The number of members chosen in the several States shall be in proportion to the respective number of their people, and shall, until the Parliament otherwise provides, be determined, wherever necessary, in the following manner:- 

(i) A quota shall be ascertained by dividing the number of the people of the Commonwealth, as shown by the latest statistics of the Commonwealth, by twice the number of senators: 

(ii) The number of members to be chosen in each State shall be determined by dividing the number of the people of the State, as shown by the latest statistics of the Commonwealth, by the quota; and if on such division there is a remainder greater than one-half of the quota, one more member shall be chosen in the State. 

New South Wales:- twenty-three;
Victoria:- twenty;
Queensland:- nine;
South Australia:- six;
Tasmania:- five;

New South Wales:- twenty-six;
Victoria:- twenty-three;
Queensland:- nine;
South Australia:- seven;
Western Australia:- five;
Tasmania:- five.

In the absence of other provisions, each State shall be one electorate. 

In the choosing of members of the House of Representatives each elector shall vote only once. 

After the first general election, the writsWrits shall be issued within ten days from the expiry of a House of Representatives or from the proclamation of a dissolution thereof.
This assigns the task of issuing write to the Speaker alone.  As a time limit is stipulated here within which action is required, any discretion, if exercised, is limited.

(i) He must be of the full age of eighteen years, and must be an elector entitled to vote at the election of members of the House of Representatives, or a person qualified to become such elector, and must have been for three years at the least a resident within the limits of the Commonwealth as existing at the time when he is chosen:

(ii) He must be a subject of the Queen, either natural-born or for at least five years naturalised under a law of the United Kingdom, or of a Colony which has become or becomes a State, or of the Commonwealth, or of a State an Australian citizen:

(iii) Such other reasonable limits as the Parliament may prescribe as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
C.f. the s1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."

The Speaker shall cease to hold his office if he ceases to be a member. He may be removed from office by a vote of the House, or he may resign his office or his seat by writing addressed to the Governor-General.

The Speaker shall preside over the House of Representatives, and shall have and may exercise such powers and functions as are assigned to him by this Constitution.
This defines the role of  the Speaker.  The House of Representatives no longer chooses one of its own to be Speaker; see the s35A - s40.  C,f, s1.

Nominations shall close twenty-eight days prior to the expiration of the term of service of the incumbent Speaker, or twenty-eight days following an announcement of the intended resignation of the Speaker or a vacancy occurring in the office of Speaker, whichever first happens.  If, at the close of nominations, no candidates have been nominated, the Constitutional Council may nominate such candidates as it thinks fit.
Although members of the House of Representatives no longer chooses one of its own to be Speaker, its members can still nominate candidates to the office.  In recognition of the fact that the Speaker may exercise certain powers in respect of the Senate, senators too may nominate candidates to the office.  C.f. 70B.

When more than two candidates have been nominated for the office of Speaker, the Constitutional Council shall, by secret ballot, assign between one and five votes to each candidate, and the total of all votes for each candidate shall be calculated.  The name of the candidate (or in the case of equality of votes, candidates) having the smallest number of votes shall be excluded from subsequent ballots, and a fresh ballot shall take place; but if by reason of equality of votes less than two candidates would remain on the ballot following such exclusion, another ballot shall be taken.  This shall be done as often as necessary, until two candidates remain on the ballot.

When only two candidates remain on the ballot, or when only two candidates have been nominated for the office of Speaker, the Constitutional Council shall, by secret ballot, elect one candidate, and the candidate so elected is thereby designated as the next Speaker; but if by reason of equality of votes the ballot is rendered inconclusive, a second ballot shall be taken.  If by reason of equality of votes such second ballot is also rendered inconclusive, the President shall exercise his casting vote.

When only one candidate remains on the ballot, or when only one candidate has been nominated for the office of Speaker, that candidate is thereby designated as the next Speaker.
It is the job of the Constitutional Council to choose one of the candidates to be the Speaker.  The method of election ensures that the candidate which most members of the Constitutional Council prefer is elected.

The Speaker shall continue in office until the expiration of five years from the date on which he enters upon that office, unless before the expiration of that term of service he dies, resigns or is removed from office in accordance with this Constitution. 

But unless a Speaker dies, resigns or is removed from office in accordance with this Constitution, notwithstanding the expiration of his term of service, the Speaker shall continue in office until his successor enters upon the office. 

A person may serve more than one term of service as Speaker.
The Speaker has a fixed term of service which is not tied to terms of the House of Representatives.  This will tend to enhance the independence of the office of Speaker.

The remuneration of a Speaker shall not be altered during his continuance in office; and no such person shall be entitled to receive any remuneration from the Commonwealth in respect of any other office during his continuance in office.
C.f. original s3.  This is similar to the arrangement which applies to the Governor-General.  This will tend to enhance the independence of the office of Speaker.

At any sitting of the House of Representatives, while any motion for an address praying for the removal of the Speaker is under consideration, the Speaker shall not preside, though he may otherwise take part in the proceedings of the House. Upon such address having been made, the Speaker shall be deemed to be temporarily incapacitated until the Constitutional Council has voted to decide the issue, or until the expiration of four days from the said address, whichever first happens.  During such period of temporary incapacity, the Acting Speaker shall preside over the House of Representatives, and the President shall, with the consent of the Constitutional Council, exercise all other powers of the Speaker.
This prevents a "Mexican stand-off"when an action to dismiss a Speaker is pending.  During this time the President exercises the powers of the Speaker, with the Acting Speaker presiding over the House of Representatives.

(i) except in accordance with the instrument of appointment; 

(ii) except at the request of the Speaker that he exercise that power or function on that occasion; 

(iii) unless since being appointed a deputy of the Speaker he has made and subscribed, in like manner as the Speaker, an oath or affirmation of office for the office of deputy of the Speaker in the form set forth in Schedule I to this Constitution.

(i) Such deputies of the Speaker in such order of precedence as the Speaker may prescribe for the purpose.

(ii) Such officers in such order of precedence as the Constitutional Council may prescribe for the purpose.

(iii) The Chancellor of the House of Representatives.

(iv) Such officers in such order of precedence as the Speaker may, by Proclamation or otherwise, appoint for the purpose.

(v) Such officers in such order of precedence as the Parliament may prescribe for the purpose.

The Speaker shall be deemed to be temporarily incapacitated upon declaration of the same by the Speaker, or upon declaration of the same by the Constitutional Council.  If the Speaker stands aside from office the provisions of this Constitution relating to temporary incapacity of the Speaker shall apply mutatis mutandis.
This clearly defines the conditions under which a Speaker is temporarily incapacitated.  C.f. s3.

If within four days of such declaration the Constitutional Council declares that the Speaker is temporarily incapacitated the House of Representatives shall meet not later than two days thereafter to decide the issue.  Not later than twenty-one days after such declaration the House of Representatives may declare by a resolution to that effect affirmed by two thirds of the total number of the members that the Speaker is temporarily incapacitated, but if the House of Representatives rejects or fails to pass the resolution, or in the absence of a resolution, the Speaker shall be deemed not to be temporarily incapacitated.
This ensures that a Speaker cannot be unjustly prevented from resuming his/her duties.  C.f. s3A.

The Chancellor may be removed from office by the Speaker, or by a vote of the House, or he may resign his office or his seat by writing addressed to the Speaker.
Recognising that the Speaker (or Acting Speaker) or a deputy of the Speaker might not be able to attend sittings of the House of Representatives,  this section enables the House to choose a "Chancellor" to preside over the House in the same way as the Speaker.  However, the powers and functions of the Chancellor do not extend beyond that of presiding over the House to other constitutional powers and functions of the Speaker.  The title "Chancellor" is based on the title of the Speaker of the UK House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor.

(i) Is under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a foreign power, or is subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power: or 

(ii) Is attainted of treason, or has been convicted and is under sentence, or subject to be sentenced, for any offence punishable under the law of the Commonwealth or of a State by imprisonment for one year or longer: or 

(iii) Is an undischarged bankrupt or insolvent: or 

(iv) Holds any office of profit under the Crown, or any pension payable during the pleasure of the Crown out of any of the revenues of the Commonwealth: or 

(v) Has any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any agreement with the Public Service of the Commonwealth otherwise than as a member and in common with the other members of an incorporated company consisting of more than twenty-five persons: 

But sub-section (iv) does not apply to the office of any of the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth, or of any of the Queen's Ministers for a State, or to the receipt of pay, half pay, or a pension, by any person as an officer or member of the Queen's navy or army, or to the receipt of pay as an officer or member of the naval or military forces of the Commonwealth by any person whose services are not wholly employed by the Commonwealth.
Obsolete references removed.

(i) Becomes subject to any of the disabilities mentioned in the last preceding section: or 

(ii) Takes the benefit, whether by assignment, composition, or otherwise, of any law relating to bankrupt or insolvent debtors: or 

(iii) Directly or indirectly takes or agrees to take any fee or honorarium for services rendered to the Commonwealth, or for services rendered in the Parliament to any person or State: 

(i) The mode in which its powers, privileges, and immunities may be exercised and upheld: 

(ii) The order and conduct of its business and proceedings either separately or jointly with the other House. 

(i) Trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States:

(ii) Taxation; but so as not to discriminate between States or parts of States: 

(iii) Bounties on the production or export of goods, but so that such bounties shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth: 

(iv) Borrowing money on the public credit of the Commonwealth: 

(v) Postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services: 

(vi) The naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth: 
Obsolete references removed.

(vii) Lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys: 

(viii) Astronomical and meteorological observations: 

(ix) Quarantine: 

(x) Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits: 

(xi) Census and statistics: 

(xii) Currency, coinage, and legal tender:

(xiii) Banking, other than State banking; also State banking extending beyond the limits of the State concerned, the incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper money: 

(xiv) Insurance, other than State insurance; also State insurance extending beyond the limits of the State concerned: 

(xv) Weights and measures: 

(xvi) Bills of exchange and promissory notes:

(xvii) Bankruptcy and insolvency: 

(xviii) Copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and trade marks: 

(xix) Naturalisation and aliens: 

(xx) Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth: 

(xxi) Marriage: 

(xxii) Divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto, parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants: 

(xxiii) Invalid and old-age pensions: 

(xxiiiA) The provision of maternity allowances, widows' pensions, child endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental services (but not so as to authorise any form of civil conscription), benefits to students and family allowances: 

(xxiv) The service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil and criminal process and the judgments of the courts of the States: 

(xxv) The recognition throughout the Commonwealth of the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of the States: 

(xxvi) The people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws: 

(xxvii) Immigration and emigration: 

(xxix) The influx of criminals: 

(xxx) The relations of the Commonwealth with the islands of the Pacific: 

(xxxi) The acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws: 

(xxxii) The control of railways with respect to transport for the naval and military purposes of the Commonwealth: 

(xxxiii) The acquisition, with the consent of a State, of any railways of the State on terms arranged between the Commonwealth and the State:

(xxxiv) Railway construction and extension in any State with the consent of that State: 

(xxxv) Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State: 

(xxxvi) Matters in respect of which this Constitution makes provision until or unless the Parliament otherwise provides:
See my comments in s7 regarding use of the word "unless".

(xxxvii) Matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth by the Parliaments of any State or States, but so that the law shall extend only to States by whose Parliaments the matter is referred, or which afterwards adopt the law: 

(xxxviii) The exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request or with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all States directly concerned, of any power not otherwise vested by this Constitution in the Commonwealth, except such powers the exercise of which is prohibited by which can at the establishment of this Constitution can be exercised only by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by the Federal Council of Australasia:
The effect of "any power not otherwise vested by this Constitution in the Commonwealth, except such powers the exercise of which is prohibited by this Constitution" is functionally equivalent to the effect of "any power which can at the establishment of this Constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by the Federal Council of Australisia"; i.e., powers which are neither vested in the States or in the Commonwealth.  See also s20 in Schedule II.

(xxxix) Matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in any department or officer of the Commonwealth.

(xl) The execution of any power vested by this Constitution in any Principal Officer of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature, or in the Government of the Commonwealth, or in any authority or person exercising the executive power of the Commonwealth.
States unambiguously certain undisputed legislative powers.

(i) The seat of government of the Commonwealth, and all places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes:

(ii) Matters relating to any officer, organ or authority established by or under this Constitution, or to any department of the public service, including those the control of which is by this Constitution are transferred to the Executive Government of the Commonwealth:

(iii) Other matters declared by this Constitution to be within the exclusive power of the Parliament.

The Senate may not amend proposed laws imposing taxation, or proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual services of the Government. 

The Senate may not amend any proposed law so as to increase any proposed charge or burden on the people.

The Senate may at any stage return to the House of Representatives any proposed law which the Senate may not amend, requesting, by message, the omission or amendment of any items or provisions therein. And the House of Representatives may, if it thinks fit, make any of such omissions or amendments, with or without modifications. 

Except as provided in this section, the Senate shall have equal power with the House of Representatives in respect of all proposed laws.

Laws imposing taxation, except laws imposing duties of customs or of excise, shall deal with one subject of taxation only; but laws imposing duties of customs shall deal with duties of customs only, and laws imposing duties of excise shall deal with duties of excise only. 

This provision should be read in conjunction with s5, s28 and s63B.

The members present at the joint sitting may deliberate and shall vote together upon the proposed law as last proposed by the House of Representatives, and upon amendments, if any, which have been made therein by one House and not agreed to by the other, and any such amendments which are affirmed by an absolute majority of the total number of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives shall be taken to have been carried, and if the proposed law, with the amendments, if any, so carried is affirmed by an absolute majority of the total number of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives, it shall be taken to have been duly passed by both Houses of the Parliament, and shall be presented to the Governor-General President for the Queen's assent. 

If after having been thus returned both Houses of the Parliament, in the same or the next session, again pass the proposed law without any amendments the proposed law shall again be presented to the President for assent; but a proposed law thus presented may not be returned.
If the President returns the bill to the Parliament, but if the bill is again passed without amendments, the first paragraph of this section again applies, except that the President may not return the bill a second time; i.e., he may either assent to the bill or withhold assent.

This power enables the President to involve himself in a political process, but while the power itself is not only weak but also dependent on the consent of the Constitutional Council, its symbolism, when exercised judiciously, could be strong.

If within ten days after having been presented to the President for assent a proposed law has not been assented to nor been returned, the same shall be deemed to have been assented to, unless the House in which it originated by its adjournment has prevented its return, in which case the House shall deal with the proposed law when it next sits.
See my comments in s58.

The powers, functions, rights, privileges, immunities and prerogatives of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth shall be enjoyed by the Federal Executive Council, or by the Commonwealth, as the case may be, subject to this Constitution and to such regulations as the Parliament prescribes.

The Prime Minister or a Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council so authorised by him may convene meetings of the Federal Executive Council.

Unless the Parliament otherwise provides, the presence of at least three members of the Federal Executive Council, including either the Prime Minister or the Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council, shall be necessary to constitute a meeting of the Federal Executive Council.

A Prime Minister shall be the chief Minister of State and the Head of Government of the Commonwealth, and shall be the President of the Federal Executive Council.

Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. They shall be members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth.
By convention the Governor-General always accepts the advice of the Prime Minister regarding this.  This amendment formalises the convention by vesting the power in the Prime Minister rather than in the Speaker acting with the advice of the Prime Minister, as the Speaker's involvement would be redundant.

The Ministers of State shall receive as remuneration such annual sum, payable out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, as the Parliament fixes.

By convention the Governor-General always accepts the advice of the Federal Executive Council regarding this.  This amendment formalises the convention by vesting the power in the Federal Executive Council rather than in the Speaker acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council, as the Speaker's involvement would be redundant.

Posts, telegraphs, and telephones:

Naval and military defence:

Lighthouses, lightships, beacons, and buoys:

Quarantine.

(i) Declare war on foreign powers:

(ii) Appoint ambassadors, consuls and other diplomatic representatives:

(iii) Grant reprieves and pardons:

(iv) Confer honours and titles, provided that no such honour or title shall be hereditary or otherwise transferrable.

The Constitutional Council may engage in such symbolic or ceremonial activities as it thinks fit.
This means that the President, the Vice-President and the other three members may engage in the sort of symbolic or ceremonial activities typically engaged in by the Governor-General, by the Queen or by members of the extended royal family.

The Constitutional Council has the right to seek advice, to encourage or to warn at any time.
These are the typical rights of a Head of State in a Westminster system, and they also apply to the Governor-General.

For the purposes of this section, the immediate past Speaker, the immediate past President and the immediate past Vice President shall be taken to be the most recent person incumbent in that office other than the current incumbent, except that persons having been removed from office as Speaker, President, Vice President or member of the Constitutional Council shall be disregarded.
The proportional representation method of election (as is used for the Senate) means that, while containing the size of the Constitutional Council, its elected members are broadly representative of the population, while the associate members bring experience and attitudes from the past.  The "immediate past" office-holder is taken to be the last person incumbent in the office other than the current incumbent.

The House of Representatives may review any such nomination and may reject it by a resolution affirmed by two thirds of the total number of the members of House of Representatives, but any motion for such a resolution must be sponsored by the Prime Minister and by the Leader of the Opposition, or by three members of Parliament who are members of the Government party or coalition of parties and three members of Parliament who are members of the Opposition party or coalition of parties.
Nominees may be excluded as candidates only with broad bipartisan support.  Politicians would have to bear the political ramifications of such a controversial act.

Nominations shall open from the first day of the term of service of the Constitutional Council and shall close three months before the expiry of the Constitutional Council by effluxion of time, or twenty-eight days following the dissolution of the Constitutional Council, whichever first happens.
Nominees may be nominated over almost the entire term of the Council, giving the public plenty of time to do so.

If, at the close of nominations, fewer than fifteen candidates have been nominated, either House of the Parliament may nominate such candidates as it thinks fit.  But if, at the close of nominations, more than fifty candidates have been nominated, the House of Representatives may vote, by secret ballot and by the method of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote, to choose fifty candidates from amongst those already nominated, following the determination of which the remaining candidates shall be eliminated.
The Parliament can ensure that there are at least 15 candidates but no more than 50.  The method by which candidates are excluded if there are more than 50 in order to bring the total down to 50 ensures that only those candidates who are least popular amongst MPs are eliminated.

The term of service of a new Constitutional Council shall be six years, taken to begin on the first day of November nearest the expiration of the term of service of the previous Constitutional Council, except in the case of the election next after any dissolution of the Constitutional Council, when the term of service shall be taken to begin on the first day of November preceding the day of its election.

Unless a member of the Constitutional Council dies, resigns or is removed from office in accordance with this Constitution, notwithstanding the expiration of his term of service, that member of the Constitutional Council shall continue in office until his successor enters upon the office. 

A person may serve more than one term of service as a member of the Constitutional Council.
The Constitutional Council has a fixed term.

A member of the Constitutional Council other than the President may resign his office as member of the Constitutional Council by writing addressed to the President, or if there is no President or if the President is absent from the Commonwealth the Vice-President, or if there is no Vice-President or if the Vice-President is absent from the Commonwealth the Chief Justice of the High Court, or if there is no Chief Justice of the High Court or if the Chief Justice of the High Court is absent from the Commonwealth to such officers as the Parliament may prescribe for the purpose, or in the absence of such provision, to such officer as the President shall appoint. Such resignation shall take effect at the time specified therein.

The presence of all full members shall be necessary to constitute a meeting of the Constitutional Council for the exercise of its powers.

Subject to this Constitution, questions arising in the Constitutional Council shall be determined by the vote of a majority of full members, and each full member shall have one vote.  The President shall in all cases be entitled to vote; and when the votes are equal the President shall have a casting vote.  Associate members shall not be entitled to vote in questions arising in the Constitutional Council.
C.f. s.40.

(i) Shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council President in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council:
The President is bound by the advice of the Federal Executive Council.  In this case it is the President, not the Speaker, who performs this function.  The reason for this is that the Speaker's involvement extends to matters concerning the Parliament and (particularly in respect of the exercise of reserve powers) to the Executive - both partisan arenas.  The appointment of judges, in contrast, should be free from partisanship, and direct involvement by the head of state should lend more dignity to the office.  Accordingly, in the area of the judiciary, it is the President, rather than the Speaker, who is involved.

One might legitimately suggest that the method of appointment of judges be similar to the method of appointment of the Speaker, with the Constitutional Council making the final decision; or alternatively, that it should be a "qualified discretionary power" as defined in s126C.  In Restoring the True Republic (G. Walker, S. Ratnapala and W. Kasper, Centre for Independent Studies, 1993), the authors say:
 

If there is a need to be an elected head of state, the true republicans could propose that that office be provided with sufficient independence, perhaps by popular election, to provide a balance to an otherwise autocratic prime minister.  The extremely wide powers of the executive could be reformed.  In the absence of the monarchy, there is no justification for the executive government possessing such monarchical prerogatives as the powers to prorogue Parliament, to dissolve the House of Representatives at any time, and to make treaties and appoint judges without legislative sanction.


The final point in respect of appointment of judges is pertinent here.  One may also cite such a role for the Constitutional Council as being a further justification for the body's existence as a standing body, as an inevitable question would be whether the Constitutional Council has too few duties.  This, however, is beyond the scope of this particular model.

(ii) Shall not be removed except by the Governor-General in Council President in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council, on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity:
See my comments in sub-section (i).

(iii) Shall receive such remuneration as the Parliament may fix; but the remuneration shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

The appointment of a Justice of a court created by the Parliament shall be for a term expiring upon his attaining the age that is, at the time of his appointment, the age for Justices of that court and a person shall not be appointed as a Justice of such a court if he has attained the age that is for the time being the maximum age for Justices of that court. 

Subject to this section, the maximum age for Justices of any court created by the Parliament is seventy years. 

The Parliament may make a law fixing an age that is less than seventy years as the maximum age for Justices of a court created by the Parliament and may at any time repeal or amend such a law, but any such repeal or amendment does not affect the term of office of a Justice under an appointment made before the repeal or amendment. 

A Justice of the High Court or of a court created by the Parliament may resign his office by writing under his hand delivered to the Governor-General President. 
This is a ceremonial role for the President.

Nothing in the provisions added to this section by the Constitution Alteration (Retirement of Judges) 1977 affects the continuance of a person in office as a Justice of a court under an appointment made before the commencement of those provisions.
This has been moved to s11 of Schedule II.

A reference in this section to the appointment of a Justice of the High Court or of a court created by the Parliament shall be read as including a reference to the appointment of a person who holds office as a Justice of the High Court or of a court created by the Parliament to another office of Justice of the same court having a different status or designation. 

(i) Of any Justice or Justices exercising the original jurisdiction of the High Court:

(ii) Of any other federal court, or court exercising federal jurisdiction; or of the Supreme Court of any State, or of any other court of any State from which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an no appeal lies to the Queen in CouncilSupreme Court of that State: 
This guarantees that, subject to limitations imposed by Parliament, appeals from any court may potentially reach the High Court.  The deleted text might have provided a loophole by which States could prevent appeals from certain courts to the High Court.

(iii) Of the Inter-State Commission, but as to questions of law only:
References to the Inter-State Commission are probably obsolete.

But no exception or regulation prescribed by the Parliament shall prevent the High Court from hearing and determining any appeal from the Supreme Court of a State in any matter in which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies from such Supreme Court to the Queen in Council. 
This guarantees that no limitations may be imposed by Parliament in respect of appeals from State Supreme Courts, regardless of whether the right to appeal to the Privy Council existed in 1901.

Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the conditions of any restrictions on appeals to the Queen in Council from the Supreme Courts of the several States shall be applicable to appeals from them to the High Court.
Spent.

The High Court may so certify if satisfied that for any special reason the certificate should be granted, and thereupon an appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council on the question without further leave.

Except as provided in this section, the Constitution shall not impair any right which the Queen may be pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal prerogative to grant special leave of appeal from the High Court to Her Majesty in Council. The Parliament may make laws limiting the matters in which such leave may be asked, but proposed laws containing any such limitation shall be reserved by the Governor-General for Her Majesty's pleasure.
Obsolete.

(i) Arising under any treaty: 

(ii) Affecting ambassadors, consuls or other representatives of other countries: 

(iii) In which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party: 

(iv) Between States, or between residents of different States, or between a State and a resident of another State: 

(v) In which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth: 

(i) Arising under this Constitution, or involving its interpretation: 

(ii) Arising under any laws made by the Parliament: 

(iii) Of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction: 

(iv) Relating to the same subject-matter claimed under the laws of difference States. 

(i) Defining the jurisdiction of any federal court other than the High Court: 

(ii) Defining the extent to which the jurisdiction of any federal court shall be exclusive of that which belongs to or is invested in the courts of the States: 

(iii) Investing any court of a State with federal jurisdiction. 

But until the expiration of one month after the first meeting of the Parliament the Governor-General in Council may draw from the Treasury and expend such moneys as may be necessary for the maintenance of any department transferred to the Commonwealth and for the holding of the first elections for the Parliament.
Spent.

Any such officer who is not retained in the service of the Commonwealth shall, unless he is appointed to some other office of equal emolument in the public service of the State, be entitled to receive from the state any pension, gratuity, or other compensation, payable under the law of the State on the abolition of his office. 

Any such officer who is retained in the service of the Commonwealth shall preserve all his existing and accruing rights, and shall be entitled to retire from office at the time, and on the pension or retiring allowance, which would be permitted by the law of the State if his service with the Commonwealth were a continuation of his service with the State. Such pension or retiring allowance shall be paid to him by the Commonwealth; but the State shall pay to the Commonwealth a part thereof, to be calculated on the proportion which his term of service with the State bears to his whole term of service, and for the purpose of the calculation his salary shall be taken to be that paid to him by the State at the time of the transfer.

Any officer who is, at the establishment of the Commonwealth, in the public service of a State, and who is, by consent of the Governor of the State with the advice of the Executive Council thereof, transferred to the public service of the Commonwealth, shall have the same rights as if he had been an officer of a department transferred to the Commonwealth and were retained in the service of the Commonwealth.
Spent.

(i) All property of the State of any kind, used exclusively in connexion with the department, shall become vested in the Commonwealth; but, in the case of the departments controlling customs and excise and bounties, for such time only as the Governor-General in Council may declare to be necessary [Spent.]:

(ii) The Commonwealth may acquire any property of the State, of any kind used, but not exclusively used in connexion with the department; the value thereof shall, if no agreement can be made, be ascertained in, as nearly as may be, the manner in which the value of land, or of an interest in land, taken by the State for public purposes is ascertained under the law of the State in force at the establishment of the Commonwealth that time:
This reflects the fact that transfer of departments from a State to the Commonwealth could, in theory, occur at any time, and not just at the establishment of the Commonwealth.

(iii) The Commonwealth shall compensate the State for the value of any property passing to the Commonwealth under this section; if no agreement can be made as to the mode of compensation, it shall be determined under laws to be made by the Parliament: 

(iv) The Commonwealth shall, at the date of the transfer, assume the current obligations of the State in respect of the department transferred. 

The balance shall, in accordance with this Constitution, be paid to the several States, or applied towards the payment of interest on debts of the several States taken over by the Commonwealth.
Spent.

(i) The Commonwealth shall credit to each State the revenues collected therein by the Commonwealth.

(ii) The Commonwealth shall debit to each State

(a) The expenditure therein of the Commonwealth incurred solely for the maintenance or continuance, as at the time of transfer, of any department transferred from the State to the Commonwealth;

(b) The proportion of the State, according to the number of its people, in the other expenditure of the Commonwealth.

(iii) The Commonwealth shall pay to each State month by month the balance (if any) in favour of the State.

On the imposition of uniform duties of customs all laws of the several States imposing duties of customs or of excise, or offering bounties on the production or export of goods, shall cease to have effect, but any grant of or agreement for any such bounty lawfully made by or under the authority of the Government of any State shall be taken to be good if made before the thirtieth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and not otherwise.
Spent references removed.

But notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, goods imported before the imposition of uniform duties of customs into any State, or into any Colony which, whilst the goods remain therein, becomes a State, shall, on thence passing into another State within two years after the imposition of such duties, be liable to any duty chargeable on the importation of such goods into the Commonwealth, less any duty paid in respect of the goods on their importation.
Spent references removed.

(i) The duties of customs chargeable on goods imported into a State and afterwards passing into another State for consumption, and the duties of excise paid on goods produced or manufactured in a State and afterwards passing into another State for consumption, shall be taken to have been collected not in the former but in the latter State:

(ii) Subject to the last sub-section, the Commonwealth shall credit revenue, debit expenditure, and pay balances to the several States as prescribed for the period preceding the imposition of uniform duties of customs.

But any duty so imposed on any goods shall not exceed during the first of such years the duty chargeable on the goods under the law of Western Australia in force at the imposition of uniform duties, and shall not exceed during the second, third, fourth, and fifth of such years respectively, four-fifths, three-fifths, two-fifths, and one-fifth of such latter duty, and all duties imposed under this section shall cease at the expiration of the fifth after the imposition of uniform duties.

If at any time during the five years the duty on any goods under this section is higher than the duty imposed by the Commonwealth on the importation of the like goods, then such higher duty shall be collected on the goods when imported into Western Australia from beyond the limits of the Commonwealth.
Spent.

(i) Shall be appointed by the Governor-General in President in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council:
C.f. s72.

(ii) Shall hold office for seven years, but may be removed within that time by the Governor-General inPresident in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council, on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity:
C.f. s72.

(iii) Shall receive such remuneration as the Parliament may fix; but such remuneration shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

(a) the taking over of such debts by the Commonwealth; 

(b) the management of such debts; 

(c) the payment of interest and the provision and management of sinking funds in respect of such debts; 

(d) the consolidation, renewal, conversion and redemption of such debts; 

(e) the indemnification of the Commonwealth by the States in respect of debts taken over by the Commonwealth; and 

(f) the borrowing of money by the States or by the Commonwealth, or by the Commonwealth for the States. 

(3) The Parliament may make laws for the carrying out by the parties thereto of any such agreement.

(4) Any such agreement may be varied or rescinded by the parties thereto. 

(5) Every such agreement and any such variation thereof shall be binding upon the Commonwealth and the States parties thereto notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution or the Constitution of the several States or in any law of the Parliament of the Commonwealth or of any State. 

(6) The powers conferred by this section shall not be construed as being limited in any way by the provision of section 105 of this Constitution. 

The powers, functions, rights, privileges, immunities and prerogatives of the Crown in right of the State shall be enjoyed by the Governor of the State, or by the State, as the case may be, subject to this Constitution and to such regulations as the Parliament of the State prescribes.
C.f. s61.

Subject to this Constitution, the Parliament of the Commonwealth may make laws to give effect to the provisions of section 110A and of this section, notwithstanding that the powers and functions of the Governor and other matters relating to the office of Governor may be prescribed by the law of the State.
Enables the Commonwealth and State Parliaments to specify the details of these arrangements in their respective spheres of responsibility whilst avoiding conflict between Commonwealth and State laws dealing with this matter.

Such territory shall contain an area of not less than one hundred square miles, and such portion thereof as shall consist of Crown lands shall be granted to the Commonwealth without any payment therefor.

The Parliament shall sit at Melbourne until it meet at the seat of Government.
Spent.

(a) there is no such Officer; or

(b) no person is acting as that Officer; or

(c) that Officer refuses to act or fails to act in accordance with such provision,

(a) at noon, ten days after the date on which the act was required by such provision to have been performed; or

(b) at a time and date set by the Constitutional Council; or

(c) at a time and date set by the Federal Executive Council,

In so acting (or omitting to act), the Principal Officer shall have due regard to established conventions.
C.f. original s63.  This affects powers in ss28, 35A, 35F, 58, 63, 63A, 63B and 70.

In so acting (or omitting to act), the Principal Officer shall have due regard to established conventions.
C.f. original s63.  This affects the powers of the Speaker in s5, s56 and s57.  The original provision of these sections give the Governor-General nominal discretion to act, though by convention, this is always exercised on advice.  This model gives "qualified discretionary power" to the Speaker.  Convention dictates that under normal circumstances the Speaker would not act alone but would accept advice from the Federal Executive Council, and indeed when advised to act by the Federal Executive Council, the advice is binding.  However, under exceptional circumstances the Speaker might decide to act according to his discretion without having received advice from the Federal Executive Council.

The Commonwealth means the Commonwealth of Australia as established and continuing under this Constitution. 

The Crown refers to the sovereignty of Australia vested in the Commonwealth, the States, the Territories and any other authorities exercising powers or functions under the Constitution, but, subject to this Constitution and to law, where this term is used to refer to an individual personage, it refers to the President.

The Original States means New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia. 

The States means the original States, and such territories as may be admitted into or established by the Commonwealth as States.

A Principal Officer of the Commonwealth means one or any of the President, the Vice-President, the Constitutional Council, the Chief Justice, the Speaker, the President of the Senate, the Prime Minister or the Federal Executive Council.

The proposed law for the alteration thereof must be passed by an absolute majority of each House of the Parliament, and not less than two nor more than six months after its passage through both Houses the proposed law shall be submitted in each State and Territory of the Commonwealth to the electors qualified to vote for the election of members of the House of Representatives. 

But if either House passes any such proposed law by an absolute majority, and the other House rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with any amendment to which the first-mentioned House will not agree, and if after an interval of three months the first-mentioned House in the same or the next session again passes the proposed law by an absolute majority with or without any amendment which has been made or agreed to by the other House, and such other House rejects or fails to pass it or passes it with any amendment to which the first-mentioned House will not agree, the Governor-General Speaker, acting in accordance with the advice of the Federal Executive Council, may submit the proposed law as last proposed by the first-mentioned House, and either with or without any amendments subsequently agreed to by both Houses, to the electors in each State and Territory of the Commonwealth qualified to vote for the election of the House of Representatives.
By convention the Governor-General always accepts the advice of the Federal Executive Council regarding this.  This amendment formalises the convention.

When a proposed law is submitted to the electors the vote shall be taken in such manner as the Parliament prescribes. But until the qualification of electors of members of the House of Representatives becomes uniform throughout the Commonwealth, only one-half the electors voting for and against the proposed law shall be counted in any State in which adult suffrage prevails.
Spent references removed.

And if in a majority of the States a majority of the electors voting approve the proposed law, and if a majority of all the electors voting also approve the proposed law, it shall be presented to the Governor-GeneralPresident for the Queen's assent. 

No alternation diminishing the proportionate representation of any State in either House of the Parliament, or the minimum number of representatives of a State in the House of Representatives, or increasing, diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of the State, or in any manner affecting the provisions of the Constitution in relation thereto, shall become law unless the majority of the electors voting in that State approve the proposed law. 

In this section "Territory of the Commonwealth" means any territory referred to in section 122 of this Constitution in respect of which there is in force a law allowing its representation in the House of Representatives. 

The first President may be chosen before the expiration of the term of service of the incumbent Governor-General.

(i) the validity or continued effect, after the establishment of the republic, of anything done before that time under this Constitution or under the law in force in the Commonwealth; or 

(ii) the continuity of the Parliament and its proceedings after the establishment of the republic; or 

(iii) the qualifications of a senator or a member of the House of Representatives for the remainder of the term of a person who is a senator or member at the establishment of the republic; or 

(iv) the continuity of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth, including in particular the membership and proceedings of the Federal Executive Council, after the establishment of the republic; or 

(v) the continuity of courts and their jurisdiction and proceedings after the establishment of the republic.

But after the establishment of the republic, in the absence of a resolution declaring that the Queen shall continue to be head of state of the State, or following a resolution by the Parliament of a State declaring that the Queen shall cease to be head of state of that State:

(i) the Queen shall cease to be head of state of the State, and shall have no powers or functions in respect of the State;

(ii) the Governor of the State shall cease to be Her Majesty's representative in the State;

(iii) the provisions of any law, rule, decree or order of the Commonwealth, or of the Constitution of a State, or of any law, rule, decree or order of a State referring to the Crown (in the case of an individual personage) in right of that State, or to the Queen in right of the State, shall be construed as referring to the President.

References to the Queen in this clause shall extend to the Queen's heirs and successors in the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom.

Nothing in this clause prevents the amendment of section 7 of the Australia Act 1986, or section 7 of the Australia Act 1986 of the United Kingdom to the extent that it forms part of the law of the Commonwealth or a State, in accordance with subsection 15(1) of the Australia Act 1986.

Any such law may be repealed as to any State by the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or as to any colony not being a State by the Parliament thereof.